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In disputes involving the violation of intellectual property rights, it is common 
practice to investigate the alleged infringer’s activities either after demanding that the 
infringer cease and desist or after commencement of a lawsuit.1  Intellectual property 
owners want to know whether infringing activities continue after action is initiated, 
whether court orders are being obeyed and whether infringing activities have changed in 
quantity or quality.  While most attorneys hire private investigators to perform such 
services without a thought to their propriety, some recent decisions have shed light on 
this practice with respect to Rule 4.2 of the 2002 ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (the “Model Rules”) and similar rules promulgated in most jurisdictions.2 
This article will describe how the rules of ethics have been understood by the 
courts to allow investigative activities (limited to contact that mimics the represented 
party’s transactions with consumers) in the context of intellectual property rights 
enforcement when this enforcement involves contact with a represented party.  Section I 
describes the applicable Rules, as stated in the Model Rules.  Section II discusses 
decisions that have addressed the issue.  Section III addresses the ABA’s guidance on the 
issue.  Finally, Section IV attempts to show that the previously discussed authorities are 
in harmony with the purposes of the anti-contact rule and delineates proper conduct under 
the Rules. 
I. THE RULES 
A. RULE 4.2 
Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules states: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject 
of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by 
 ∗  J.D. 2001, Harvard University Law School.  Attorney in the law firm of Pattishall, McAuliffe, 
Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson. 
1 The ethics of ex parte contacts with employees of an organization is a broad subject.  This article is 
limited to an analysis of such contacts in the context of intellectual property litigation. 
2 For purposes of this article, it will be assumed that all jurisdictions apply the Model Rule, or a rule 
substantially similar to the Model Rule.  Of course, to properly evaluate one’s ethical obligations, it is 
necessary to check the particular rule applicable in the jurisdiction at issue. 
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another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the 






Comment 7 to Rule 4.2 states: 
In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits 
communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, 
directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the 
matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the 
matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be 
imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability.4 
B. RULE 8.4 
Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules in pertinent part states: 
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce 
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;. . . [and] (c) engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. . .5 
The plain language of the Rules suggests that it is professional misconduct for an 
attorney to elicit an admission from an employee of an organization by sending an 
investigator posing as a customer to the organization’s place of business after the 
organization is known to be represented by counsel.6  Investigations of intellectual 
property rights violations can potentially involve management employees, especially 
when the alleged infringer is a mom-and-pop operation or other small business.  
Nevertheless, if an employee is selling products to the public at a store, warehouse or 
over the phone, the employee’s rank should be of no moment in an analysis of the ex 
parte contact. 
Low-level employees, such as retail staff, are also within the ambit of Rule 4.2 
because Comment 7 prohibits contacts with a constituent whose act or omission may be 
imputed to the organization or whose statement may constitute an admission.  Since it is 
generally the goal of interlocutory investigations to reveal continued violations or to 
3 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2002). 
4 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (2002). 
5 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2002). 
6 It should be said that challenges to such investigative evidence can also arise under Rule 4.1, 
concerning misrepresentations to third parties.  Rule 4.1 states: “In the course of representing a client a 
lawyer shall not knowingly. . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person. . .” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (2002).  Comment 1 to that rule states: “A lawyer is required to be 
truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf. . . A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer 
incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. . .” MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. (2002).  The practice of having individuals pose as consumers during 
intellectual property disputes generally has been accepted as ethical and will not be discussed here.  For a 
discussion of the responsibilities of lawyers for deception by undercover investigators, see generally Darid 
B. Isbell & Lucantonion N. Falvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover 
Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation 
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,  8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995). 
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ensure compliance with temporary relief, such investigations are almost exclusively 
conducted with the purpose of seeking out evidentiary admissions.  Violations of the 
Rules can result in sanctions against the attorney involved and the inadmissibility of 







Although this conundrum has been addressed only rarely by the federal courts, 
some insight can be gleaned from the available decisions. 
 
II. THE CASE LAW 
A. THE GIDATEX DECISION 
In Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 7 the issue of contacting a represented 
party arose by a motion in limine to exclude evidence obtained through conversations 
between plaintiff’s investigators and defendant’s sales clerks.  The defendants sought to 
exclude the investigator’s testimony, reports and tape-recorded conversations as a 
sanction for plaintiff’s purported violations of the anti-contact rule.8 
The facts of this case are representative of typical investigations conducted during 
trademark infringement litigation.  Defendant Campaniello had been a licensed sales 
agent of “Saporiti Italia” furniture.  Plaintiff Gidatex, the manufacturer of the furniture, 
had terminated Campaniello’s license, but Campaniello continued to sell the “Saporiti 
Italia” furniture that it had in stock.  Gidatex alleged that Campaniello lured customers to 
its showrooms by displaying the “Saporiti Italia” trademark, then selling customers 
furniture produced by other manufacturers.  To prove this classic case of passing-off, 
Gidatex’s counsel hired private investigators to pose as interior designers and tape record 
conversations with Campaniello’s salespeople.9 
The Gidatex court provided three reasons why defendants’ motion in limine to 
exclude evidence should be denied: (1) the ethics rules were not applicable to the 
situation; (2) plaintiff’s attorneys had not violated the ethics rules even if they were 
applicable; and (3) exclusion of evidence was not the proper remedy for a violation of the 
ethics rules.10 
The court stated that the purpose of the anti-contact rule was to preserve the proper 
functioning of the attorney-client relationship.11  Noting that the investigators did nothing 
more than any ordinary consumer of the products would have done, the court found that 
the sales clerks, as low level employees, would not have disclosed, or even have known, 
7 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 119-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
8 Id.  The court was construing the American Bar Association (“ABA”) and the New York State Bar 
Association (“NYSBA”) Disciplinary Rule (“DR”) 7-104(A)(1), which states: 
During the course of the representation of a client a lawyer shall not. . .communicate or cause 
another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be 
represented by a lawyer in that matter unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the lawyer 
representing such other party or is authorized by law to do so. 
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.35 (2003).  This rule is not significantly different from Rule 
4.2 of the Model Rules. 
9 Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 120. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 122 (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l. Ethics Op. 607 (1990) at 1). 
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any information protected by the attorney-client privilege.12  The court also noted that the 
statements made by the clerks were no different than the statements they would have 






After examining the purpose of the anti-contact rule, the court explained that the 
policies underlying trademark and unfair competition law made application of the anti-
contact rule in such contexts inappropriate, stating: “These ethical rules should not 
govern situations where a party is legitimately investigating potential unfair business 
practices by use of an undercover [agent] posing as a member of the general public 
engaging in ordinary business transactions with the target.”14 
The court noted that undercover investigators provide an effective enforcement 
mechanism for detecting and proving unfair competition and, without them, such activity 
might otherwise escape detection.  The court approvingly cited cases where reliable 
investigative testimony was found to be probative and admissible evidence in trademark 
disputes.15  Thus, as the Gidatex court recognized, prohibiting undercover, interlocutory 
investigations would undermine the policy goals of trademark and unfair competition law 
while not furthering the goals of the attorney-client privilege, the preservation of which is 
a purpose of the anti-contact rule. 
The difficulty for attorneys facing a decision on whether to conduct an 
investigation during the pendency of a lawsuit is underscored by the Gidatex court’s 
decision that, assuming the ethics rules applied in such situations, plaintiff’s attorney 
“technically” satisfied the three-part test used by the Second Circuit to determine whether 
the disciplinary rules have been violated.16  Despite this technical violation, the court 
nevertheless concluded that the “actions [of plaintiff’s counsel] simply do not represent 
the type of conduct prohibited by the rules.  The use of private investigators, posing as 
consumers and speaking to nominal parties who are not involved in any aspect of the 
litigation, does not constitute an end-run around the attorney client privilege.”17 
Lastly, but not of least importance, was the court’s brief commentary that even if 
the ethics rules had been violated, exclusion of evidence was not the proper remedy 
because it would not serve the public interest or promote the goals of the disciplinary 
rules.18 
12 Id. at 126. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 122. 
15 Id. at 124 (citing Nikon v. Ikon Corp., 803 F. Supp. 910, 921-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d, 987 F.2d 91, 
95-96 (2d Cir. 1993); Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1186, 1188 (D.C.N.Y. 
1984), aff’d, 765 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1985); Union Carbide v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 384 (7th Cir. 
1976)). 
16 Id. at 125-26.  The Second Circuit’s test is as follows: (1) Did counsel communicate with a “party”?  
(2) If so, did counsel know that the party was represented by a lawyer in this matter?  (3) Did counsel 
“cause” the communication to occur?  See Miano v. AC&R Advert. Inc., 148 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
17 Gidatex, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 126. 
18 Id. 
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Similar to Gidatex, in Apple Corps Ltd., v. International Collectors Society, 19 the 
defendants in a copyright infringement action previously resolved by a consent decree 
filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs brought a contempt 
proceeding after a compliance investigation revealed that the defendants had not abided 
by the consent decree. 
The original action was brought by various owners, including Yoko Ono Lennon, 
of the rights in the names, likenesses and trademarks of The Beatles, Paul McCartney and 
John Lennon to stop the defendants’ sale of postage stamps bearing images of The 
Beatles and Yoko Ono Lennon (“Beatles/Lennon stamps”).20  The parties resolved their 
dispute by a Consent Order, which was entered by the court. 
After plaintiffs’ counsel became aware of defendants’ possible violation of the 
Consent Order, plaintiffs’ counsel conducted an investigation to determine whether the 
defendants were in compliance.  The court stated that the communications between 
plaintiff’s investigators and defendants’ sales representatives “were limited to listening to 
recommendations about which stamps to purchase and accepting an order for Sell-Off 
stamps.”21  The plaintiffs’ investigators did not ask sales representatives any questions 
about instructions given or received, or about the defendants’ practices or policies, with 
regard to the Beatles/Lennon stamps.  The investigation revealed that the defendants were 
not in compliance with the Consent Order, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for 
contempt.22  The defendants then moved for dissolution of the Consent Order and for 
sanctions pursuant to Rule 4.2, among others.23 
The court found plaintiffs’ investigative activities were not prohibited by New 
Jersey’s rules of ethics.  New Jersey law only provides protection from contact for “an 
organization’s litigation control group.”24  In New Jersey, the litigation control group is 
defined as those persons in an organization who are “current agents and employees 
responsible for or significantly involved in the determination of the organization’s legal 
position in the matter. . .”25  Given the New Jersey rule, the court had no trouble finding 
that the defendants’ sales clerks did not fall within the litigation control group and, 
therefore, the ex parte contacts were permitted.26  The court did note, though, that such ex 
parte contacts would have to be conducted in accordance with Rule 4.3, which deals with 
contacts on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel.27 
The court explained the policies underlying the anti-contact rule: “to prevent 
situations in which a represented party may be taken advantage of by adverse counsel,”28 
19 15 F. Supp. 2d 456, 458 (D.N.J. 1998). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 474. 
22 Id. at 462-66. 
23 Id. at 472. 
24 Id. at 473 (citing N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2). 
25 Id. (citing N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.13).  The court expressly noted that New Jersey’s 
version of the anti-contact rule explicitly excluded persons whose actions bind the organization or are 
imputable to the organization unless they meet the “legal position” test. Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 474 
(citing Report of the Special Supreme Court Comm. on RPC 4.2, 139 N.J. L.J. 1161, 14 (1995)). 
26 Id. at 474. 
27 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002). 
28 Id. (citing Niesig v. Team I, 558 N.E.2d 1030 (1990)). 
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and “to avoid ‘artful’ legal questioning.”29  The court also opined, “it is not the purpose of 






The court also turned its attention to misrepresentations made during the 
investigation.  Such misrepresentations were only in regard to identity and purpose for 
calling.31  Thus, the court stated: 
RPC 4.2 cannot apply where lawyers and/or their investigators, seeking to 
learn about current corporate misconduct, act as member[s] of the general 
public to engage in ordinary business transactions with low-level 
employees of a represented corporation.  To apply the rule to the 
investigation which took place here would serve merely to immunize 
corporations from liability for unlawful activity, while not effectuating any 
of the purposes behind the rule.32 
C. EVIDENTIARY SANCTIONS FOR RULES OF ETHICS VIOLATIONS 
In Midwest Motor Sports, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., the court granted sanctions 
against the defendant because defendant’s counsel violated South Dakota’s Rules of 
Professional Conduct by using an investigator to record conversations with the plaintiff’s 
sales representatives and, thereby, attempted to obtain evidence and elicit admissions. 33  
Specifically, the court excluded all evidence obtained from the surreptitious investigation, 
including recordings of the investigator’s conversations with the plaintiff’s sales clerks, 
the investigator’s testimony, and any other evidence obtained by the defense as a result of 
the recorded conversations.34  Although this decision appears to be contrary to both 
Gidatex and Apple Corps in substance and outcome, a careful review of the facts reveals 
that the court was properly concerned about the scope of the investigation.  Nevertheless, 
while Midwest Motor Sports is capable of interpretation within the paradigm of Gidatex 
and Apple Corps, the decision serves as a warning to counsel not to overreach in 
conducting investigations of represented parties. 
Midwest Motor Sports involved a dispute concerning the discontinuance of the sale 
of a certain snowmobile line at the plaintiff’s store.  Here, the Defendant’s  investigator 
posed as a customer and recorded his conversations with “Bill,” one of plaintiff’s 
29 Id. (citing Weider Sports Equip. Co., Ltd. v. Fitness First, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 502 (D. Utah 1996)). 
30 Id. (citing Weider, 912 F. Supp. at 510); see also Johnson v. Cadillac Plastic Group, Inc., 930 F. 
Supp. 1437 (D. Colo. 1996) (holding Rule 4.2 is a rule of ethics rather than a rule of corporate immunity 
and an expansive reading would curtail the truth-seeking function of the courts). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 474-75 (citing Weider 912 F. Supp. 502).  The court also analyzed the propriety of using 
misrepresentation under New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c), which prohibits conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.  Here, the court, citing Bruce A. Green, the co-
chair of the ABA Litigation Section’s Committee on Ethics and Professionalism, stated that: “The 
prevailing understanding in the legal profession is that a public or private lawyer’s use of an undercover 
investigator to detect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where it would be 
difficult to discover the violations by other means.” Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 475. 
33 It is not illegal in South Dakota for one party to record a conversation without the other party’s 
knowledge or consent.  144 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (D.S.D. 2001) (citing State v. Braddock, 452 N.W.2d 
785, 788 (S.D. 1990)). 
34 Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. 
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salesmen, during two separate visits to plaintiff’s store, as well as a conversation with 
another snowmobile salesman at another party’s store.35  Of particular importance to the 
court’s decision here were admissions by the investigator during his deposition that the 
purpose of his visits to plaintiff’s store was to elicit evidence in the case and obtain 
information that went far beyond anything a typical consumer would be given during an 





In describing the purpose of his visits, the investigator stated that the defendant’s 
attorneys had hired him, in part, to visit a showroom, to talk to a salesman about 
products, to find out which snowmobiles were being recommended, and to look at the 
equipment.36  The investigator further believed that he was visiting the plaintiff’s store in 
order to determine “what was selling best” and “whether [defendants] were hurt because 
Arctic Cat wasn’t being sold there any longer.”37  His understanding of why he recorded 
his conversation with the salesman at the other party’s store was, in part, to see if the 
salesman would say anything about the lawsuit.38  In addition, the investigator stated that 
he was instructed to “get into financing, promotions, and close-out pricing” with the sales 
people at plaintiff’s store and “have the sales person relate. . .the situation on all the 
snowmobiles.”39  At the end of his deposition, the investigator responded affirmatively to 
the question of whether the purpose of his visits was to elicit evidence in the case on 
behalf of defendant’s attorneys rather than to reveal evidence regarding sales clerk’s 
representations to typical consumers of snowmobiles.40 
The court’s analysis of the anti-contact rule began with an explanation of its 
purposes.  The four purposes of Rule 4.2 are: (1) to prevent attorneys from circumventing 
opposing counsel in order to obtain statements from adverse parties; (2) to protect the 
integrity of the attorney-client relationship; (3) to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of 
privileged information; and (4) to facilitate settlement by channeling disputes through 
attorneys.41 
The court rejected the notion that all employees of an organization are protected by 
Rule 4.2, stating that such automatic representation would impede investigation and place 
too much power in the employer to control ex parte contacts.42  It then went on to adopt 
the holding in Cole v. Appalachian Power Co.,43 that an attorney may not conduct ex 
parte interviews with five classes of an organization’s current employees under Rule 4.2, 
unless counsel has the consent of the opposing attorney or is otherwise authorized by law.  
These classes include “current. . .employees whose act or omission in connection with the 
matter may be imputed to the corporation or organization for purposes of civil or criminal 
liability,” and “agent[s] or servant[s] of the corporation or organization whose statement 
35 Id. at 1151-52. 
36 Id. at 1150. 
37 Id. at 1150-51. 
38 Id. at 1151.  The sales person to whom the investigator spoke at the other store happened to be the 
owner of the store and was already represented by counsel in the lawsuit because he was a non-party 
witness.  The fact that he was the owner, and thus a management level employee, did not seem to make a 
difference in the court’s decision. 
39 Id. at 1151. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 1154 (citing Guillen v. City of Chicago, 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1427 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). 
42 Id. 
43 903 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.W.Va. 1995). 
  53 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 3  
 
concerns a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, which statement was 
made during the existence of the relationship and which is offered against the corporation 
or organization as an admission.”44  Significantly, the court also pointed out that Rule 4.3 
would prevent an investigator from misrepresenting his identity to a person not 
represented by counsel.45  Finally, the court distinguished cases such as Apple Corps 






After resolving the issue of what contacts were and were not prohibited by South 
Dakota’s rules of ethics, the court announced that sanctions were not to be had under this 
arguably new interpretation of Rule 4.2 from the contacts with Bill the salesman.  
Instead, the court found that sanctions were proper under Rule 4.3 because the interviews 
took place under false pretenses.47  The court also awarded sanctions, under Rule 4.2, for 
contact that the investigator had with the president of another corporation, who was 
represented by counsel in another suit with the defendant.  That contact involved the 
investigator posing as a potential customer of snowmobiles and, by coincidence, he spoke 
with the president of the corporation at the corporation’s store.48 
The court further admonished prospective litigants, “[i]f counsel practicing before 
this Court commit similar ethical violations in the future, however, the sanctions imposed 
will not be so lenient.”49 
D. A CONTINUUM OF CONDUCT 
Although not in the context of intellectual property litigation, in Hill v. Shell Oil 
Co., the court’s analysis of the three aforementioned decisions suggested that there was a 
continuum of conduct from permissible to impermissible.50  In Hill, the plaintiffs 
conducted undercover investigations of gas station attendants, including videotaping, to 
document discriminatory practice.51  The defendants moved for a protective order 
44 Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1156-57.  The court placed emphasis on the fact that Rule 
4.2 must be read in conjunction with Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(D), which is an exception to the 
hearsay rule that provides for the admissibility of statements by an agent or servant of a party offered 
against that party. 
45 Id. at 1157 (citing Cole, 903 F. Supp. at 980) (“The attorney or investigator shall: (1) fully disclose 
his or her representative capacity to the employee, (2) state the reason for seeking the interview as it 
concerns the attorney’s client and the employer, and (3) inform the individual of his or her right to refuse to 
be interviewed”). 
46 Id. at 1157. 
47 Id. at 1158; see also In Re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (reviewing disciplinary proceeding and 
rejecting proposed investigatory exception to the rule against misrepresentation–imposing sanction of 
public reprimand on attorney who made false statements during investigation prior to commencement of 
action).  In 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court amended its disciplinary rule to allow a lawyer to advise and 
to supervise otherwise lawful undercover investigations of violations of civil law, criminal law, or 
constitutional rights if the lawyer “in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful 
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.”  See OR. CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1-102(D) (2003). 
48 Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.  
49 Id. at 1160. 
50 209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
51 Id. 
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prohibiting future investigative videotaping because such investigations violated 






The court first determined that Rule 4.3 did not apply to this case because the 
employees were represented parties.  It reasoned that the employees’ allegedly 
discriminatory conduct could be attributable to the defendant employer and that the 
employees’ statements potentially could be used as admissions against the defendant 
employer.  Specifically, the court in Hill stated that the “scope of employee statements 
that constitute employer admissions is provided in Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)(D),” which comports with the understanding of the District of South Dakota.53  
Thus, the employees were covered by Rule 4.2 as represented parties under the comments 
to the Rule.54 
In attempting to balance the decisions in Midwest Motor Sports and Gidatex, the 
court found the following spectrum of conduct: 
Lawyers (and investigators) cannot trick protected employees into doing 
things or saying things they otherwise would not do or say.  They probably 
can employ persons to play the role of customers seeking services on the 
same basis as the general public.  They can videotape protected employees 
going about their activities in what those employees believe is the normal 
course.55 
Therefore, the court found that videotape recordings of employees reacting to 
persons posing as consumers were properly obtained under Rule 4.2.  Nevertheless, the 
court reserved until trial the admissibility determination of the substantive conversations, 
held outside of normal business transactions, between the defendant’s employees and the 
plaintiff’s investigative agents.56 
III. ABA OPINION 396 
In 1995, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) issued Formal Opinion 95-396 
(“Opinion 396”) on the meaning of Rule 4.2.57  Opinion 396 reveals two important 
aspects of interlocutory investigations: first, the timing of Rule 4.2’s attachment to 
52 Id. (citing N. DIST. OF ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 and R. 4.3 (2002)). 
53 Hill, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 879. 
54 Id. at 878-79.  The court noted that the comment to Rule 4.2 stated that for purposes of the rule’s 
prohibition employees that are considered represented include: employees who have managerial 
responsibility on behalf of the organization; employees whose acts or omissions in the matter can be 
imputed to the organization; and employees whose admissions would be binding on the organization. Hill, 
209 F. Supp. 2d at 878 (citing Orlowski v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 723, 728 (N.D. Ill. 
1996); Weibrecht v. Southern Illinois Transfer, Inc., 241 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2001)).  The court distinguished 
Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998).  New Jersey law only provided protection for members of 
the litigation group. 
55 Hill, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 880. 
56 Id. 
57 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995).  Opinion 396 was given as 
a result of the controversy over the Department of Justice’s regulations on communications with 
represented parties.  See id. at n.1. 
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communications between an attorney and a represented party, and second, whether all 
employees of an organization are covered by Rule 4.2’s prohibition once it does attach. 
Opinion 396 makes clear that the application of the Rule does not depend 
on a proceeding having actually commenced. . .The interests that the Rule 
seeks to protect are engaged when litigation is simply under consideration, 
even though it has not actually been instituted, and the persons who are 
potentially parties to the litigation have retained counsel with respect to 





Therefore, the moment an attorney knows the party sought to be contacted is 
represented in the matter, whether as a potential adversary, witness or simply to protect 
its interests in the matter, Rule 4.2 attaches.  For example, if an attorney is investigating 
an organization for potential action, it can do so without concern for the strictures of Rule 
4.2, even if that organization has general counsel.  But after a cease and desist letter is 
sent or other contact is made, if the organization directs the matter to its general counsel, 
then Rule 4.2 now applies to subsequent contacts. 
Opinion 396 also makes clear that representation of an organization does not bar 
communications with all employees of that organization.  The ABA first looked to the 
Model Code to establish the central proposition upon which Rule 4.2 rests: that the legal 
system functions best when persons in need of legal assistance are represented by their 
own counsel.59  Thus, 
the anti-contact rules provide protection of the represented person against 
overreaching by the adverse counsel, safeguard the client-lawyer 
relationship from interference by adverse counsel, and reduce the 
likelihood that clients will disclose privileged or other information that 
might harm their interests.60 
The ABA likewise made clear that “the term represented party refers not only to 
those with managerial responsibilities but to anyone who may legally bind the 
organization with respect to the matter in question.”61  Moreover, “[i]f an employee 
cannot by statement, act or omission bind the organization with respect to the particular 
matter, then that employee may ethically be contacted by opposing counsel. . .”62  The 
latter interpretation by the ABA was made in the context of an illustration explaining that 
even if in-house counsel declares that none of the employees of in-house counsel’s 
organization may be contacted without in-house counsel’s permission, a lawyer would 
not be barred from making contact with those employees whose statements, acts or 
omissions could not bind the organization with respect to the matter at issue.63 
58 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995) (emphasis in original). 
59 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995). 
60 Id. (citing Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The 
Controversies Over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 325 (1992)). 
61 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995). 
62 Id. 
63 Opinion 396 does state that otherwise impermissible contacts made through investigators are 
misconduct under Model Rule 8.4(a). 
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¶38 Use of the word “bind” by the ABA in this context is particularly instructive.  Bind 
means “to obligate or to bring under definite duties or legal obligations.”64  Opinion 396, 
though, does not purport to place any import to its use of the term.  In fact, Opinion 396 
explains that anyone who can legally bind the organization includes those persons who 
are already covered by the Comments, i.e., those whose statements may be imputed to or 






Therefore, Opinion 396 puts the question of acceptable contact squarely on the 
meanings of the terms “imputed” and “admission” as they are used in the Comments to 
Rule 4.2.  An admission, in this context, is a statement offered against a party made by 
the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment.66  It is clear under Opinion 396, without even looking at the meaning of the 
term “imputed,” that contact with low-level employees through investigations of 
allegedly infringing conduct during the course of litigation is within the prohibition of 
Rule 4.2. 
IV. GUIDANCE FROM THE LAW 
The reasoning embodied in the Hill, Apple Corps and Gidatex decisions is sound as 
to both the purposes and the application of the ethics rules.  The purposes of the anti-
contact rule are not in doubt.  An attorney must not seek an advantage for his client by 
circumventing opposing counsel and communicating directly with the adverse party. 
The revelation of an infringer’s customary business practice is not such an 
advantage.  The infringer directs his business to consumers of his products.  Therefore, an 
attorney merely places his client on equal footing with the general public when he 
conducts an undercover investigation that is strictly directed to the infringer’s conduct in 
relation to consumers.  Thus, the only potential disadvantage an infringer suffers by 
directing his activities to an investigator rather than a true customer is, at most, the lost 
time and money if the investigator fails to make a purchase.67  There is no sound basis for 
a rule of law that affords less information to litigants than to the typical consumer. 
An attorney who uses a private investigator posing as a consumer or customer is 
not attempting to circumvent opposing counsel but rather is trying to unearth illegal 
activity.  The purpose of the rule is not “to protect a corporate party from the revelation 
of prejudicial facts.”68  Evidence of such activity would otherwise be very difficult to 
obtain.  Even advocates of a blanket prohibition on contact with represented parties allow 
for exceptions when the policies underlying certain laws would be thwarted by the literal 
64 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 153 (5th ed. 1979). 
65 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 396 (1995). 
66 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 44 (5th ed. 1979) (defining 
“admission” as statements by a party, or some one identified with him in legal interest, of the existence of a 
fact which is relevant to the cause of his adversary). 
67 Investigators in intellectual property rights infringement actions are generally asked to purchase 
specimens, so even this argument fails. 
68 Bouge v. Smith’s Mgmt. Corp., 132 F.R.D. 560, 569 (D. Utah 1990) (quoting Wright By Wright v. 
Group Health Hospital, 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984) (deciding that the Comment to Rule 4.2 of the Rules of 
Professional Responsibility of the Utah State Bar or DR-7-104(A)(1) did not apply to restrict ex parte 
interviews with low level employees and that “admissions” test under F.R.E. 801(d)(2)(D) should also not 
apply in such circumstances)); see also Apple Corps, 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 n.25 (D.N.J. 1998). 
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interpretation of the anti-contact rule.69  The policies underlying intellectual property 
infringement actions are likewise undermined by literal application of the anti-contact 
rule. 
The lesson from Midwest Motor Sports is that if an investigator is sent to an 
infringer’s place of business, he should understand that his sole purpose is to behave as 
an ordinary consumer and not actively attempt to seek admissions.  In Midwest Motor 
Sports, the investigator was asked in his deposition, “. . .the purpose of these trips wasn’t 
to be a consumer shopping for a snowmobile, it was to attempt to elicit evidence in a 
pending civil case on behalf of the lawyers that hired you, correct?”  The investigator 
answered “yes.”70  As stated in Hill, the investigator can seek services on the same basis 
as the general public, but cannot trick protected employees into doing or saying things 
they otherwise would not do or say.71  Investigators must know that their goal is to reveal 
evidence of the ordinary consumer’s experience and not to gather evidence above and 
beyond that goal. 
For the more cautious attorney, perhaps the safest course is to seek, ex parte, leave 
of court to conduct an investigation of an infringer’s continuing violations.72  While this 
method may be more time consuming and not have the flexibility of simply asking an 
investigator to run over to the store and see what the salespeople have to say, it provides 
much more in the way of assurance to the attorney involved that the court will not level 
sanctions against him. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ethical dilemma encountered by intellectual property litigants in conducting 
investigations of represented parties is no dilemma at all if counsel is clear about the 
purpose and conduct of the investigators’ visit.  It is important that the investigator know 
his role and that he do only those things that an ordinary consumer would do under 
similar circumstances.  If counsel is concerned with a particular jurisdiction’s rules of 
ethics, the safest course is to seek leave to conduct the investigations ex parte from the 
Judge—at the very least in South Dakota. 
69 See David A. Green, Balancing Ethical Concerns Against Liberal Discovery: The Case Of Rule 4.2 
And The Problem of Loophole Lawyering, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 283 (1995) (allowing for exception in 
cases involving discrimination allegations and government investigation of wrongdoing). 
70 Midwest Motor Sports, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1152.  The court noted that the investigator in this case 
also actively sought admissions, asking questions of Bill the salesman that went beyond those of the typical 
consumer. 
71 209 F. Supp. 2d at 877. 
72 See, e.g., Flebotte v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., No. 97-30117-FHF, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21327 (Mass. 
Dist. Ct. June 28, 2001). 
